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It is certainly true, that ‘the State as such … cannot be easily attacked or 
destroyed’ (Badiou 2005:110). Even in the current age of neoliberalism 
and intensified globalization, argues Harvey (2006:28), the wide-ranging 
reconfigurations of state institutions and practices indicate that the state is 
not redundant. Harvey substantiates, convincingly, the claim that states have 
the capacity to prevail in the face of new challenges in a radically changing 
world. In my view, these notions reflect the fact that states are vested with 
a transcending omnipotence that, in the words of Kapferer (2008:7), is 
‘oriented to achieving an exclusive and overarching determining potency in 
the fields of social relations in which it is situated and which state or state-
related practice attempts to define’ (see also Gulbrandsen 2014:14ff.). At the 
same time, however, Clastres (1989:189ff.) was certainly right in contending 
that no matter how omnipotent and sustainable they are, states are always 
circumscribed by non-statist forces, exterior to the state, working – at least 
potentially – in ways destructive to the order of the state.
This duality of forces that, on the one hand, are vested in the state and, 
on the other hand, surround and confront the state, suggests a fundamentally 
antagonistic relationship between the interiority and exteriority of the 
state. Such a conception is reflected in Deleuze and Guattari’s (2003:424ff.) 
important view of the state as vested with an ‘apparatus of capture’ that is 
always challenging and being challenged by rhizomic forces denoted, in these 
authors’ terminology, as ‘war machines’. In their conception, the strength 
of ‘the State’ basically depends on the capacity of the ‘apparatus of capture’, 
as they argue that ‘the State is sovereignty. But sovereignty only reigns over 
what it is capable of internalizing, appropriating.’ (2003:360). They hold that 
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the state is vested with sustainable ‘organs of power’ and ’has always been in 
relation with an outside and is inconceivable independent of that relationship’. 
This is not a matter of ‘foreign policy’ in relation to other states. Rather, 
Deleuze and Guattari’s concern is with, on the one hand, ‘huge world-wide 
machines’ like multinational organizations or religious formations such as 
Christianity and Islam, and on the other, ‘local mechanisms of bands, margins, 
minorities, which continue to affirm the rights of segmentary societies in 
relation to the organs of State power’ (ibid.).
These are, as suggested, all forces exterior to the state vested with a 
capacity to challenge the state, i.e. ‘war machines’, which, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception, always operate in fundamental conflict with the order 
of the state and its ‘apparatus of capture’. In their scheme, the ‘state apparatus 
of capture’ and the ‘war machine’ are irreducible to one another while 
simultaneously having no independent existence; they co-exist in ‘competition 
in a perpetual field of interaction’ (2003:360, italics original). The state is 
hence always potentially or manifestly threatened by its exteriority; that is, by 
what ‘escapes the State or stands against States’ (2003:361).
In these authors’ conception, such antagonism does not involve, in any 
sense, a stable balance of power. On the contrary, the relationship is highly 
dynamic; any successful advance of the state apparatus of capture readily 
triggers war-machine metamorphoses, generating rhizomic forces in new 
disguises. Hence, states are always challenged by forces exterior to themselves 
or are facing the challenge of capturing what escapes their structures 
of domination. But, of course, the ways in which the interior-exterior 
dynamics have worked themselves out differ tremendously cross-culturally 
and historically.
I have found these theoretical considerations helpful in my present effort 
to discuss transmutations of power in processes of colonization in the long-
term perspective of changing historical realities. I am pursuing this overall 
issue by, firstly, discussing colonial states’ struggles to expand their realm 
in the face of challenging rhizomic forces. Secondly, I want to address the 
challenge for post-colonial states of establishing a modern, independent 
state, in view of their generation of new exteriorities, even at the heart of 
the state, manifesting rhizomic forces in ever changing disguises. In order to 
demonstrate how contrastingly the expansion of colonizing forces can work 
themselves out in different colonial contexts and historical situations, I shall 
pursue these issues by reflecting comparatively upon the colonization of the 
island of Sardinia in the Mediterranean, and of the Tswana and other peoples 
of the present Botswana. In this, I shall draw upon my recent fieldwork in 
Sardinia and many years of research in Botswana. 
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As we shall see, while Sardinia was subject to consecutive colonizing 
states, from the Phoenicians onwards, these always struggled to gain full 
control over the population of the island. However, Britain’s establishment of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate was hardly ever resisted; to some extent, it was 
even appreciated. The development of the modern Italian state by capturing 
Sardinia into its trajectory is perceived by many Sardinians I have encountered 
as highly exploitative, and is even seen as another colonization of the island. 
The establishment of the modern state in Botswana brought, by contrast, the 
Tswana and other peoples of that country into full control of the modern, 
post-colonial state. In both of these cases, we shall see how the modern state 
is vested with a forceful apparatus of capture, containing a pervasive capacity 
to incorporate the population into its structures, yet at the same time creating 
new exteriorities with challenging potentialities.
I want to demonstrate that state interior-exterior dynamics in the two 
cases differ sharply by means of what Sahlins and others have dubbed 
uncontrolled comparison, which I find helpful in achieving a higher degree of 
reflexivity conducive to comprehending the significance of some important 
cultural and social-political phenomena pertaining to the two cases (Herzfeld 
2001:259ff.). Due to space limitations, and because I have analysed the Tswana 
case extensively in previous publications,1 my analysis will privilege the 
Sardinian case, using the Tswana for comparative reflection. Nevertheless, I 
will represent the two cases sufficiently comprehensively to demonstrate huge 
differences in forms of colonial state expansion and modern state formation in 
relation to challenging forces generated in exteriorities of the state. 
Challenges of colonial state formation
Located in the middle of the Mediterranean, the population of Sardinia 
has, as far back as historical accounts go, been in interaction with peoples 
from the wider world. While there is evidence of human settlements on the 
island dating as far back as 120,000 bc, the first records of actual colonial 
settlements, by Phoenicians, ‘only’ go back to 900 bc (Tanda 1995). During 
Sardinia’s prehistoric past, its population was ostensibly in full control of 
the island, especially in the era of what is presently conceived as the Nuragic 
civilization (e.g. Lilliu 2003). The people of this era have left momentous stone 
constructions – according to some sources more than 8,000, erected from 
1,800 bc onwards – that are, to a great extent, still found over significant parts 
of the island. They feature in popular discourse as major symbols of a proud 
ancient past of prosperity and social order, although very little is actually 
known about their social and political organization..
1 Especially, Gulbrandsen 2014; see also 1993, 1995, 1996a and b, 2003 and 2007.
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The Nuragic era allegedly prevailed for some 1,500 years; that is, until 
significant exterior forces commenced encroachment on the island. There 
appears to have been a soft start to what, in due course, would become ever 
more violent confrontations between internal and external forces. Thus, the 
first historically recognized people of significance to arrive – Phoenicians 
from Carthage – restricted, in the beginning, their occupation to establishing 
some coastal settlements, including Tharros, ostensibly in peaceful intercourse 
with Sardinians. However, when the Phoenicians, around 650 bc, established 
a military force and expanded into the island’s fertile plains, they began 
exploiting the wheat production there at the cost of the indigenous population. 
In due course, they also extracted salt and silver. The Sardinians responded 
to the intrusion by violently attacking Phoenician settlements. By calling 
upon assistance from Carthage, the Sardinians’ offensive was successfully 
counteracted and the Phoenicians took firm control of significant parts of 
southern Sardinia.
The long Roman era on Sardinia – lasting for almost 700 years – was 
initiated in 238 bc, in the wake of the First Punic War, with the establishment 
of Sardinia and Corsica as Roman provinces (Mastino 1995). Existing coastal 
settlements on Sardinia were expanded, and new ones were established and 
populated by Roman immigrants. Wilson points out that Sardinia was more 
fertile than Corsica and represented ‘a major corn supplier of Italy at the 
time of the late Republic; herein lay her sole political importance. Yet her 
inhabitants were not to be trusted, banditry was rife.’ (2006:442, italics added).
This observation of banditry reflects that, first Phoenician, and then 
Roman expansion into Sardinia’s fertile lowland plains, progressively instigated 
Sardinians to escape into the highlands of central Sardinia. These regions of 
the island were highly inaccessible – and remained so to a significant extent 
into the twentieth century – which meant that they were only partially under 
Roman and successive colonizing states’ control, despite the deployment of 
military garrisons in places such as the present-day village of Mamoiada in the 
central highland of Barbagia.2
2 According to Wilson (2006:443) ‘The sending of 4,000 Jewish dissidents to 
Sardinia in A.D. 19, as raw recruits to help quell the still rebellious interior, with 
a clear hint that they were expendable in case of disease, suggests continuing 
problems in establishing a firm military stranglehold. To Rome this was the hostile 
territory of Barbaria, and although its collective peoples (civitates Barbariae) are 
recorded as paying homage on an inscription of either Augustan or Tiberian date, 
a military garrison of auxiliary units was needed to keep a watchful eye on the 
interior for much of the first century.’
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We have at hand the initiation – some 2,000 years ago – of a very 
long series of relationships of conflict between the successive state forces 
colonizing Sardinia and the resisting populations of the island, generating, as I 
shall explain, patently rhizomic forces, the remains of which are still at work. 
In other words, the generation of exteriorities to the state – which has been 
identified in many parts of the Mediterranean (see, for example, Hobsbawm 
2003:7ff.; Sorge 2014) – has a very long genealogy in Sardinia, where anti-state 
orientations are still, as we shall see, quite strong.
From the time the Romans were defeated by the Vandals in 456 ad and 
until the eighth century ad, the island was invaded by Vandals and Byzantines, 
with the latter finally withdrawing in response to mounting Arab attacks.3 At 
that time, indigenous state processes were set in motion through which the 
island was divided into four sovereignties, known as giudicato (pl. giudicati),4 
each with military forces to defend their respective realms against the 
notoriously challenging Arabs. Moreover, for the exercise of jurisdiction and 
collection of tax, each guidicato was divided into administrative units (curie) 
comprised of a number of villages. The guidicati had no feudal structure (see 
Bloch 2004:247), but were supported by a class of independent landlords to 
whom I shall return in a subsequent section. The guidicati came under the 
influence of Genevan and Pisan forces. Furthermore, Pisa’s attempt to frustrate 
the Papal State’s (under Innocent III, r.1,198–216) effort to establish authority 
in Sardinia was only partially successful (see Moore 1987).
After a complex interplay between Sardinian and external forces, the 
island was finally conquered by the Kingdom of Aragon in the early fifteenth 
century; the Spanish henceforth embarked on colonizing the island. That was 
the end of indigenous state processes in Sardinia, as the Spanish colonial state 
entailed the progressive formation of a new hierarchical order, notably by 
establishing a feudal system with predominantly Spanish nobles as landlords. 
This nobility’s integration into the colonial state is underscored by the fact 
that numerous landlords retained their residences in Spain, and were closely 
connected to the Spanish crown. Compared with Britain’s light colonization 
of the Tswana (see below), which entailed virtually no settler colonization 
(Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1 and 2), the Spanish on Sardinia set in motion a 
much more radical transformation, in which the Spanish themselves engaged 
extensively, in particular by appropriating vast areas of fertile land and 
establishing feudal structures of domination.
3 See Galoppini 1995; Mastino 1995; Tanda 1995.
4 They grew out of the preceding Byzantine administrative division of the island 
(see, for example, Galoppini 1995).
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This feudal system was instrumental in the colonial state’s efforts to 
expand its realm on the island by capturing ever larger sections of the 
Sardinian population, especially on the plains, and subjecting them to heavy 
taxation, fees and obligatory services (corvè). Hundreds of fiefs occupied 
large parts of Sardinia’s most productive land, catching people up in feudal 
structures controlled by the colonial state. During the centuries of Spanish 
exploitative colonization of Sardinia,5 most of the Sardinians – largely an 
impoverished population recurrently victim to plagues – experienced the 
colonial state as a persistently brutal force of repression.
This brings me to a chief concern of this chapter: how the expansion of 
the various colonial states into the island of Sardinia entailed a polarization 
between state forces and local communities, a process lasting for about four 
centuries. The repressive Spanish colonial state caused many Sardinians to 
flee, notably to locations beyond the territorial limits of the feudal structures 
and colonial state control. This consolidated some sections of the population 
in the mountainous heartland of predominantly shepherd communities, 
above all the central highland of Barbagia (a named derived from the Romans’ 
identification of the population as ‘barbarians’).
These communities – composed of shepherds with great capacity to 
move and hide in terrain quite inaccessible to colonizing forces – generated 
a multitude of rhizomic forces consisting of highly mobile bands that raided, 
in ever new disguises, feudal estates and villages in the lowland. Sardinians’ 
reactions to the colonizers’ conquest thus took many forms, yet might be 
summarized by the generic notion of banditry (banditismo; see, for example, 
Moss 1979). The structural contradictions vested in the relationship between 
statist processes and the challenging forces beyond their reach has, as we shall 
see, set the stage for the generation of rhizomic attacks on the order of the 
colonial state in successive historical contexts.
Sardinia presents a case that resembles many colonial-state situations 
around the world, characterized by an expanding colonial frontier of 
exploitative forces. Such settler-state developments were, of course, also 
distinctive of southern Africa, where violent expansion of imperial and colonial 
forces gave rise to European regimes, capturing indigenous populations into 
state structures of brutal racist domination. As I have discussed extensively 
5 As Berger (1986:136) notes, ‘the feudal system was particularly parasitic, since 
large surpluses extracted from rural producers were removed from the island to 
fund the courtly lifestyles of absentee feudal lords who maintained their residence 
in Spain. According to Mori (1966), of the 376 fiefs eventually created by Spain 
in Sardinia, 188 belonged to residents of Spain while 32 were in the name of the 
Spanish king himself.’
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elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1), in this violent context, the ruling groups 
of three major Tswana kingdoms (Bakwena, Bangwaketse and Bangwato) – 
located beyond the expanding frontier of the settler-states of Rhodesia and 
South Africa – accepted rather than resisted the British decision to take direct 
control over the vast tableland between Transvaal and the present Namibia.6 
Determined to establish supremacy of this enormous territory at minimal cost, 
the British were advantaged by the existence of a number of Tswana kingdoms 
(merafe, singl. morafe) that proved highly instrumental to implementing 
principles of indirect rule, as they established the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
in 1885 (preceding the present modern state of Botswana established as an 
independent state in 1966).
These merafe had, over the preceding hundred years, grown very 
significantly in strength and scale, as the kingship-monopolized fur and ivory 
trade had tremendously reinforced their apparatus of capture. The proceeds 
of this trade resourced the expansion of a cattle-centred political economy 
that strengthened the apparatus of capture vested in these polities, expanding 
their socio-political hierarchies by incorporation of vast alien groups. They 
were largely groups on flight westwards from the violent turmoil in the 
Transvaal, only to be incorporated in the structures of these Tswana merafe. 
The rhizomic potentialities of the increasingly complex assemblages of people 
of different origins were, as I have explained elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 1993, 
2007), efficiently counteracted by a powerful mill of assimilation vested in the 
hierarchies of the politico-jural courts of the merafe.
Such a state apparatus of capture, embedded in each of the Tswana merafe 
officially recognized by the British, constituted a major force that proved to be 
highly instrumental for expanding the control of the colonial state beyond the 
limits of these merafe (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 1). At the same time, the Tswana 
kings (dikgosi, singl. kgosi) of each of the merafe within the Protectorate 
prevailed as the supreme authority over all the peoples living in the territories 
demarcated and assigned to each of the merafe by the colonial state, denoted 
as ‘tribal reserves’. 
6 The British’ decision to establish the Bechanaland Protectorate was ostensibly 
much motivated by increasing German activity in the western part of Southern 
Africa. The British worried, argues Sillery (1974:75), ‘that the Germans might 
join hands with the hostile Boers, or with the Portuguese, or even with other 
Germans who were in East Africa, cut the road to the north and thus permanently 
bar the Cape from access to central Africa?’ As Maylam (1980:25) states, being 
‘in danger from three sides: South African Republic, Germany and Portugal’, 
the establishment of the Bechuanaland Protectorate served the British imperial 
interests in blocking South African and German expansion.
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It is true that the practices of incorporation and assimilation into the 
dominant Tswana merafe were met with considerable resistance from several 
larger communities that opted for a direct incorporation in the colonial state. 
However, assisted by the colonial power at the very few occasions when violent 
enforcement was required, the Tswana rulers compelled these communities to 
subject themselves to these rulers’ domination. 
The colonial situation of the Bechuanaland Protectorate contrasts sharply 
with that of the Spanish one in Sardinia, where rhizomic forces worked in 
ever more challenging ways. This difference reflects the manner in which the 
respective state apparatuses of capture were operating in the two contexts. 
The Spanish established a colonial state by creating a feudal structure in 
the hands of mainly Spanish lords, who appropriated vast parts of Sardinia’s 
fertile land. They expanded, as suggested, violently into the island in ways 
that created extensive exterior spaces, especially as substantial sections of 
the Sardinians escaped into the not easily controllable highlands, generating 
progressively more challenging rhizomic attacks.7
The main interest of the British, however, in the overall control of the 
vast territory of the southern African interior, was the blocking of other 
expanding, imperial forces. Only a very small colonial state administration 
was established, as the British relied on a selected number of Tswana rulers 
to control people and territory. These were rulers in control of polities with 
their own inherent apparatus of capture, which ensured that vast subject 
communities were brought under colonial state government (Gulbrandsen 
2014:46ff.).
Smaller groups of people living scattered in areas distant from Tswana 
royal towns were captured by the Tswana and brought into serfdom, or 
they escaped to parts of this enormous country that were not under Tswana 
control. While Sardo communities of Sardinia’s heartland were breeding 
grounds for mobile bands with extensive rhizomic capacities, the numerous 
small semi-stationary or mobile groups, like the foraging San-speaking 
peoples that resisted Tswana state apparatuses of capture by moving beyond 
their frontier, never had any force with which to challenge the merafe or 
the colonial state. With the Tswana pastoral frontier expanding far into the 
Kalahari, these peoples – classified by Tswana as inferior human beings 
– were progressively caught up in Tswana hierarchies, virtually as serfs 
(Wilmsen 1989:64ff.). They formed a highly exploited ‘underclass of herders’ 
at Tswana ‘cattle posts’ (ibid:130ff.), or they escaped the Tswana by moving to 
distant areas for hunting and gathering only – in due course – to find their 
7 Actually, this process of escaping colonizing forces had already been anticipated in 
the times of the Romans (Meloni 1990). 
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hunting grounds deteriorated by cattle farming, whose spatial expansion were 
accelerated by post-colonial ‘development’ programmes. Foragers’ highly 
egalitarian-commensal orientation did not provide the cultural or social 
conditions for standing up against these forces (Gulbrandsen 1991), in salient 
contrast to Sardinian pastoralists’ competitive egalitarianism of banditismo, 
which instigated rhizomic attacks on the successive colonizing state forces. 
We have, in other words, two radically different processes of colonial 
state expansion. Under the conditions of societies within the Protectorate, 
the British easily established a mild overrule that peacefully and efficiently 
captured the Tswana merafe and all other peoples into the order of the 
colonial state. The Tswana polities embodied state apparatuses of capture that 
were strengthened under colonial conditions and hence highly instrumental 
in expanding the interiority of the colonial state. The Spanish – and, as we 
shall see, subsequently, the kingdom of Piedmont – were far less capable 
of exploiting local structures of authority vested in feudal and semi-feudal 
landlords for capturing highland Sardinian communities into the interiority 
of the state.
Intensification of rhizomic forces in Sardinia
Having thus explained why the colonial state apparatus of capture in 
Sardinia gave rise to much more challenging, violent reactions than in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, I shall proceed by examining more closely the 
historical development of the apparatus of capture versus war machine/
rhizome dynamics in the Sardinian case. The violent character of the colonial 
state apparatus of capture and the generation of rhizomic forces became ever 
more evident after Sardinia had, by virtue of the London Treaty of 1718, been 
handed over from Spain to the kingdom of Piedmont on the mainland, which 
was ruled by the House of Savoy. By this territorial expansion, the House of 
Savoy elevated itself to what was named the kingship of Sardinia, albeit they 
remained seated in Turin. During the first hundred years of Piedmont-Savoy 
overrule, the efforts to crack down on what was identified as Sardo banditry 
intensified, although only to the effect of stimulating violent reactions in 
ever new ways. Hence, the state’s apparatus of capture – in its violent form 
– provoked an expansion of the exteriority of the colonial state on Sardinia, 
generating ever more challenging rhizomic forces.
This development gained further impetus after Piedmont-Savoy was 
conquered by Napoleon (1798) and brought into the orbit of the associated 
enlightenment and revolution. Under Napoleonic supremacy, feudalism 
was abandoned and land was commercialized, entailing ‘a shock to the still 
relatively traditional economic structure by introducing a set of successful 
commercializing reforms that utterly transformed north central Italian society’ 
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(Ziblatt 2006:62). In due course, this transformation paved the way for the 
industrialization that gave rise to the dominant position – ever since – of the 
North, in the modern Italian context. The force of the Piedmont-Savoy rulers, 
evolving thus, proved highly instrumental within the major state-formation 
process on the mainland, which ultimately culminated in the establishment 
of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861, following the annexations of several polities 
along the entire length of the Italian peninsula by the House of Savoy.8
With the fall of feudalism on Sardinia, a new colonizing tactic was 
implemented. As the customary communal land-tenure system was perceived 
as a major condition facilitating the prevalence of mobile pastoralists 
and hence banditismo, Piedmont-Savoy rulers initiated a land-enclosure 
movement on the island by the Editto delle Chiudende (‘Edict of closure’) of 
1820. Although this reform was, at an overall level, probably related to the 
enclosure movements of the wide-ranging agricultural transformations in 
Europe in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, in Sardinia the reform 
aimed at capturing pastoralists into structures of tight state control. That is, 
by tying them to a restricted piece of land as cultivators and developing an 
enterprising patronage class of agriculturalists with a dependent client class of 
agricultural labourers.
However, this endeavour was largely unsuccessful, mainly because the new 
landlords found it more beneficial to invest in sheep than agriculture. Many 
of them appropriated as private property vast areas of communal pasture, 
upon which impoverished pastoralists had depended, generating wide-
ranging rhizomic forces that manifested in extensive sheep robbery and riots, 
and a series of murders of landlords (see Clark 1996:83; Lai 1998:76ff.; Sorge 
2015:34f.). The state reacted with armed retaliation that further heightened 
popular reactions to the perceived escalating state oppression. The prevailing 
challenges to the state were also aggravated by feudal landlords’ support of the 
peasantry, motivated by fear of their feudal estates being dissolved and made 
available for market transactions, as had been the case on the Italian mainland.
Despite this, only a decade after the introduction of the enclosure policy 
(1835), the Piedmont did indeed endeavour to modernize Sardinia more 
comprehensively by abandoning the feudal system on the island, as they had 
on the mainland. This venture amplified deprivation amongst the pastoral 
section of the population that depended heavily upon access to feudal land for 
off-season pasturage, generating further violence. Moreover, due to access to 
favourable French and US markets – where Sardinian cheese was treasured – 
the value of sheep and pasture increased substantially, escalating competition 
8 The House of Savoy ruled Italy until 1946 when Italy was declared a republic.
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for beast and land, and hence adding momentum to rhizome-generating 
forces. 
In other words, state efforts to capture the challenging pastoral communities 
into a controllable societal fold, through projects of economic modernization 
and privatization, had serious repercussions. The consequent enhanced value 
of sheep and (now increasingly commoditized) land only intensified violent 
pastoralist attacks on farming communities (see Del Piano 1995:276). In the 
emerging imaginary of state officials – and, apparently, the Italian mainland 
population – this trend of violence identified Sardinia as a dangerous island, 
plagued extensively by delinquency. Thus, when the Savoy-driven process on 
the mainland culminated with the establishment of the modern nation-state 
of Italy in 1861, banditismo was, from the outset, recognized as the single most 
challenging problem facing the modern Italian state on Sardinia.
In order to establish a ‘scientific’ knowledge base for comprehending the 
problem, Niceforo (1977[1879]) conducted a major sociological study that 
initiated a long ethnocentric tradition of research, identifying pastoralists 
of the interior of Sardinia as constituting the island’s zona delinquente (‘a 
criminal area’). The pastoralists were alleged to be vested with a pathology 
that could infect the other, ostensibly healthy part of Sardinia (Marongiu 
2004:73ff.; Schweizer 1988:21). The state saw this as a serious problem and 
major challenge that resulted in the development of a new and violent 
apparatus of capture in the form of a major military campaign, known as 
caccia grossa – ‘the big hunt’ (Brigaglia 1971:113ff.). A ‘hunt’ that fed into the 
dynamic of progressive polarization, expanding the exteriority of the state and 
hence the spaces with the potential for generating rhizomic forces.
During the twentieth century, economic development in Sardinia was 
focused on coastal areas, while the pastoral communities of the interior 
remained in an economically depressed backwater. These circumstances 
gave rise to a new kind of rhizomic activity, as banditismo now manifested 
itself in a major wave of kidnappings of people of power and wealth in urban 
centres and tourist zones, reaching their apex in the 1960s and 1970s (see 
Marongiu and Clarke 1993). For example, one high-profile target was the 
luxurious ghetto of the Aga Khan initiated exclusive tourist development at 
Costa Smeralda, where highly affluent and conspicuous consumption was 
displayed a relatively short distance from deprived pastoral communities of 
the Barbagia. The Italian state reacted to these challenges by substantially 
extending and strengthening its military police force (carabinieri) in all the 
villages of the Barbagia, and by deploying special state troops, i caschi blu 
(‘the blue berets’), who embarked on spectacular hunts for bandits in the 
high mountains of the central Gennargentu range. This campaign, which at 
times amounted to no less than guerrilla warfare, only reinforced popular 
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ideas about Sardinians’ capacity to stand up against the state. This occurred 
in a context where ‘bandits’ were often celebrated by people in Sardinia – far 
beyond Barbagia – as hero figures; the most famous ones9 featuring in films 
that reached the wider world, where they were very well received.10
In other words, a major effect of the tremendous expansion of violent state 
power in efforts to bring the Barbagia under control was the reinforcement 
of an imaginary in which the Italian state was a brutal, alien force. This 
development exacerbated a major challenge to the state: people’s rejection of 
the state’s claim of a monopoly of jurisprudence and the exercise of violence. 
From the state point of view, these challenges further confirmed Italian 
notions of Sardinian primitivism rooted in pre-modern backwardness; that is, 
conditions in obvious conflict with the major virtues of a modern nation-state.
The prevalence of banditry in Sardinia in the context of the 
Sicilian mafia 
The heroization of bandits reflects a prevailing undercurrent in the population 
against agents of the state and affluent people. This corresponds with 
Hobsbawm’s (2003:20) notion of ‘social bandits’, identified in his seminal work 
on banditry as, 
peasant outlaws whom the landlord and state regarded as criminals, but 
who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as 
heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of 
liberation, and in any case men to be admired, helped and supported. 
 (Hobsbawm 2003:20)
Blok (2001:22) has attacked this notion by claiming that ‘Hobsbawm’s 
comparative treatment of banditry over-emphasizes the element of social 
protest while at the same time obscuring the significance of the links that 
bandits maintain with established power-holders.’ What Hobsbawm has 
9 Amongst these was perhaps the most famous bandit on Sardinia in recent 
times, Graziano Mesina of Orgosolo. He was a hero-bandit in the view of many 
Sardinians in the 1960s and 1970s, especially because of his exceptional ability to 
escape from jail (see, for example, Pisano 2004; Ricci 2009). Schweizer (1988:222) 
relates that ‘The young good-looking bandit Graziano Mesina… was found in one 
study to be the most popular model for young men in Sardinia, before the football 
hero Gigi Rivi… TV teams and reporters came even from the mainland to get the 
story of the popular “king of the mountain region” (Marongiu 1981).’
10 Notable films were Banditi a Orgosolo (www.youtube.com/watch?v=itnOVhr3H7w) 
and Disamistade (www.youtube.com/watch?v=ON3SvjIn458). 
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identified as ‘social banditry’, Blok (2001:16) insisted, is empirically highly 
marginal, as ‘bandits quite often terrorize those from whose very ranks 
they managed to arise’. With reference to a broad range of case studies from 
different parts of the world (ibid.:22ff.), Blok argued that ‘banditry’ most 
commonly appears in the form of robber bands that selfishly struggle for 
power and wealth by means of violence, and with little regard to the social 
status of victims. He claimed that rather than being governed by ‘Robin Hood’ 
virtues, bandits are often associated with oppressors and rarely with the 
oppressed. Bandits’ association with the holders of power, he claims, reflects 
their dependency on protection, increasingly so the more successful they are 
(ibid.:18). Blok (2001:21) pointed out that in mid–nineteenth-century Palermo 
many delinquents and bandit leaders in Sicily ‘were given special responsibility 
for public security’, an avenue to ‘respectability’ as institutionalized in the 
mafia. In other words, there are ‘conversions in which bandits turn into 
retainers and help reinforce oppression of peasantry’.
Blok’s attack on Hobsbawm’s analysis and his attempt to establish 
a different theory of banditry receives no support from my Sardinian 
ethnography, however. In this context, the notion of banditismo includes a 
wide range of violent practices that have never, as in Sicily and some other 
places, operated in support of the state, a ruling class or other elites. Hence, 
rhizomic forces generated in the contexts of Sardinia and Sicily have worked 
in radically different ways. This contrast can be related to Blok’s (1974:10) point 
that in Sicily the ‘Mafia emerged in the early 19th century when the Bourbon 
State tried to curb the power of the traditional land-owning aristocracy and 
encouraged the emancipation of the peasantry.’ The consequent abolishment 
of feudal rights and privileges, the formation of new entrepreneurial elites 
and the rising aspiration of the peasantry set the stage for the development 
of mafia (see Schneider and Schneider 1976:174ff.). Persons ‘were recruited 
from the ranks of the peasantry to provide the large estate owners with 
armed staff to confront both the impact of the State and the restive peasants 
… turning outlaws and bandits into allies’ (Blok 1974:11). And, note, the 
development of mafia activity involved, in this rendering, significantly more 
than organized violence: it captured people into structures of protection in a 
context where this could not be provided by the state. In particular, it ensured 
the entrepreneurial and propertied classes a degree of security that the weak 
presence of the state on Sicily was not able to provide (see Gambetta 1993).
Although the development of mafia on Sicily thus involved a certain 
degree of institutionalized – i.e. statist power beyond official state institutions 
– its relationship to the state proper became on the whole ambiguous rather 
than antagonistic. Their complex intercourse has been examined in a number 
of studies (e.g. Lupo 2004; Pezzino 1995) showing the extent to which mafia 
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activities and organizations have been conducive to the state’s societal control 
and political leaders’ electoral support, at the same time as representing major 
challenges to official virtues of democracy and state justice.
Many scholars have tried to come to terms with the conditions on Sicily 
responsible for its distinctive form of mafia practices and organization. Davis 
(1998:217), for one, argues interestingly that the ‘paternalistic order’ of the 
South collapsed much earlier than in Lombardy, Piedmont and Tuscany, 
making the South ‘one of the principal epicentres of political upheaval, 
revolution, and endemic unrest and protest in Europe down to the middle 
of the nineteenth century’. It was in this context of a weak state and elites 
that had lost their grip on the societal order that the mafia emerged, filling a 
power vacuum. As this argument goes, because of the prevailing strength of 
its ‘paternalistic order’, the North was conversely saved from the development 
of mafia structures at that time. 
What about Sardinia – an Italian region that apparently shares many 
of the features of the Italian ‘South’ (see Clark 1996)? The island is, in this 
context, a deviant case, not only in relation to Sicily, but also in relation to the 
northern as well as southern part of the Italian mainland. Although feudalism 
was abandoned about the same time on Sardinia and Sicily, banditismo was 
not transformed into mafioso activity on Sardinia, mainly because there was 
no critical power vacuum to fill as in Sicily. The Piedmont-based colonial state 
kept the Spanish landlords under tight control at the same time as it facilitated 
the establishment of a new land-owning class dependent on, and thus loyal 
to, the Piedmont regime. Moreover, the landlords on Sardinia were under 
significantly less challenge by rhizomic forces than on the far more populous 
Sicily, where a much larger deprived peasantry gave rise to mounting attacks.
As in northern Italy, the peasantry on the Sardinian lowland plains, where 
the large landlords were concentrated, was to a great extent kept in the fold of a 
‘paternalistic’ order, which was, if required, backed by a highly present colonial 
state. At the same time, Sardinia differed notably from the North in the 
existence of large territories beyond the immediate domination of landlords 
and the overall control of the state. Hence, banditismo continued to prevail 
as a major challenge to the state and the elites, composed predominantly of 
landlords. But, as I have now explained, the conditions were absent for the 
formation of mafia practices and structures.
While Sardinian banditismo thus remained a force of violence challenging 
social order as seen from the point of view of the state, the formation of the 
Sicilian mafia represented a no less challenging rhizomic force. Thus, in both 
cases, challenging forces exterior to the state have prevailed. But there is a 
notable contrast between the two islands. The mafia evolved as a force by 
actively infiltrating the state at its core, creating rhizome-generating spaces 
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exterior to the state apparatus of capture, yet always within or in the vicinity of 
state institutions. Hence the mafia’s considerable impact on the development 
of modern Italy. In Sardinia, by contrast, bandits made no such attempt to 
infiltrate state institutions by secretive intercourse with its agents. Rather, 
as I shall now discuss, banditismo here – and other practices like that of the 
faida challenging the state’s insistence of a monopoly of physical violence – 
have provoked the state to expand very substantially its apparatus of capture; 
predominantly by a strong presence of police forces all over the island. 
Challenging state monopolization of violence: protecting the 
cultural wealth of faida
It is a crucial point that the challenges of the state are culturally anchored in 
pastoral communities of Sardinia in ways that go significantly beyond ‘social 
protest’. Practices of violence here are closely linked with the symbolism of 
onore (honour) and the cultural construction of manhood, as in many other 
pastoral communities of the Mediterranean (e.g. Herzfeld 1985). Although 
the heroization of bandits who were attacking people of prominence and 
wealth, often attached to the state, finds resonance in a deprived population 
(the Robin Hood aspect), popular admiration of bandits is mainly conceived 
in terms of their fearless forcefulness, cleverness and independence. Esteemed 
above all is their ability to hide and survive in the wilderness for weeks, if not 
months; in particular in the highly inaccessible supramonte. Amongst the 
people of Barbagia the capacity to abscond from state military police forces, 
especially, symbolizes the celebrated virtue of being balente, which signifies a 
person’s proficiency in standing up, with force, fearlessness and shrewdness, 
against any danger. Such a person is attributed with balentia (see Pigliaru 
2000:218ff.) and, in challenging agents of the state, they epitomize the highly 
appreciated force inherent in Sardinian communities that came home to me 
as I listened to narratives about their claims to control over the carabinieri. An 
example would be the tale of an outlaw, hiding in the mountains, who came 
to the village to marry his fiancée in the parish church, an event followed by 
pranzo and cena with hundreds of guests – including the head of the local 
carabinieri.
Balentia might well be seen as a ‘key symbol’ (Ortner 1973), containing 
a cluster of codes and values articulated through practices that demonstrate 
a person’s force, bravery, stamina and courageous independence. This is 
a quality closely associated with the idealizing notion of noi pastori (‘we 
pastoralists’), referring approvingly to people who successfully struggle to 
master a highly competitive, even violent lifeworld in Sardinia’s wilderness. 
To be a pastoralist means to be located in an environment with a constant 
threat of livestock rustling, and thus the danger of losing the major source of 
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one’s livelihood. At stake is also the pastoralist’s reputation as a capable person 
(abile), connoting balentia. That is, a man left alone with the herd in the 
wilderness and successfully warding off livestock rustlers is typically reputed 
as balente. A pastore who has raised his reputation as balente – for example by 
successful sheep stealing – is a person who is less vulnerable to being robbed, 
except by persons of equal strength, courage and cunning.
Practices of sheep stealing make up quite elaborate ‘games’ within pastoral 
communities, and might entail violations (violazioni) perceived as damaging 
to a person’s and his family’s onore, calling for retaliation of a kind that 
sometimes escalates into a major faida (vendetta). A faida would typically 
progress, first, by sheep slaughter – a warning (‘next time it’s you’) that might 
be reinforced by cutting the throat of the other party’s horse, only to culminate 
in murder, often in the form of assassination. This is a practice of violence 
that is, as Pigliaru (2000:139) has elaborated, regulated by an intricate code, 
which he transcribed in writing as ‘Il Codice della Vendetta Barbaricina’. This 
codex frames social dramas that might, with intervals, prevail for decades, 
involving a ‘game’ of violence that demonstrates the capacity of its central 
actors to respond to being offended (offeso) by violence in ways that express 
fearlessness, independence and shrewdness. That is, in practices allowing a 
man to feature as balente. This demanding and indeed dangerous game is 
followed closely by the local community, which – though always observing 
the dictum of omerta, the oath of silence – tacitly evaluates the performance 
of those engaged; profoundly activating discursive practices centred in virtues 
of balentia. 
From the Italian state-government point of view, the practice of faida 
represents a major challenge. Firstly, of course, because the local communities 
fiercely resist police involvement and hence contest the judicial authority 
of the state and its claimed monopoly of the exercise of physical violence. 
Secondly, the faida is seen as the epitome of Sardo primitivism, in particular 
as agents of the state readily condemn this practice as an indication of a 
disturbingly low valuation of human life and a disrespect of the rule of law. 
All the state efforts to counter these challenges by hunting down murderers 
have largely amplified the virtues of banditismo: the capacity of the retaliating 
parties in a faida to escape the carabinieri is indeed a major dimension of 
balentia. Conversely, from a local perspective, popular practices of dealing 
with violence are a question of realizing major indigenous virtues. Murder 
cannot, according to their value orientation, be dealt with properly by leaving 
it with the police – arrest, court trials and imprisonment. Rather, the state 
practices of dealing with it are counterproductive and incompatible with 
proper practices of re-establishing and enhancing onore, because this requires 
that blood is retaliated with blood within the context of faida. 
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The progressively increasing presence of the carabinieri in the mountainous 
interior of Sardinia in the 1960s and 1970s thus added considerable momentum 
to the long-term dialectical dynamics of mutual antagonism between the state 
and the population, and hence to rhizome-generating polarizations between 
the state and pastoral communities, which remained only partially captured 
into the interior of the state. The celebration of banditismo as a virtue that 
manifests the strength and capability to stand up against an encroaching and 
colonizing state could be conceived of as a major counter-hegemonic force. 
Furthermore, as I have indicated above, these challenges spring from an 
indigenous socio-cultural dynamics of violence that centre on virtues of onore 
and balentia, signifying core elements of the symbolic wealth vested in these 
communities. The practising of these virtues through banditismo and faida, 
as mentioned in the indigenous codex of Il Codice della Vendetta, represents a 
major challenge to the state for the obvious reason that these violent practices 
are entirely incompatible with the modern state’s insistence on a monopoly 
of violence. During recent decades, considerable counter-forces have been 
at work, modifying people’s acceptance of physical violence as a measure to 
settle conflicts, creating considerable disagreement about the codification of 
balentia. Nevertheless, according to my records, this virtue readily instigates 
actions of an anti-state orientation. 
In conceiving this codex thus, as a matter of indigenous law incompatible 
with modern state law, an intriguing contrast emerges with the Tswana 
in the context of the modern state of Botswana. In Botswana, indigenous 
(‘patrimonial’) institutions of jurisprudence were from the outset captured 
into the modern state, as major instruments of societal control. They have 
continued to operate largely according to customary principles, at the same 
time as they are subject to a modern state-controlled customary court 
of appeal. The process of harmonizing state and ‘tribal’ jurisdiction was 
developed within the context of the colonial state and has by and large been 
continued; indigenous jurisprudence has thus been incorporated in the 
post-colonial state’s administration of justice (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 4). This 
continuity is important for comprehending the strength and stability of the 
post-colonial state in Botswana. A massive flow of court cases, initiated at 
the descent-group level and appealed through the hierarchy of courts of the 
merafe, has contributed enormously to the reproduction of institutions that 
resolve most conflicts in a peaceful manner in ways that keep vast sections of 
the population in the societal fold (Gulbrandsen 1996b, 2014:165ff.). 
This practice is premised, as among the Sardinians, upon an acute 
consciousness of the high value of popular engagement in dealing with 
conflicts. However, while the practices of faida are often driven by perpetual 
retaliations, operating violently in secret dyadic relationships (omerta) in 
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the pursuit of onore and a demonstration of balentia, the Tswana place 
tremendous value upon everybody’s engagement in the treatment of conflicts 
and tension amongst people in their public councils (kgotla) in the process 
of reconciling conflicting parties. In Tswana ontology of power, peace and 
harmony (kagiso) are always of prime importance for keeping sociality cool. 
To avoid heat in all social relations is perceived as imperative, because kagiso 
represents the overarching and the cosmologically determined condition for 
promoting fertility, health and prosperity (Gulbrandsen 2014:174ff.). In this 
context, the state prevails as ‘super-structural’ in Foucault’s (1980:122) sense, 
by capturing into its interior popular institutions of social control as well as 
the wealth of symbolic authority vested in these institutions (Gulbrandsen 
2014:ch. 4).
It is true that in Sardinia during the interregnum between the withdrawal 
of the Byzantines and the initiation of Spanish supremacy, the island was 
divided into four giudicati (see above) that were developed largely in order 
to establish military forces against Arab attacks (see Boscolo 1978:112ff.). 
This development gave birth to two sets of indigenous Sardinian law codes 
– Statuti di Sassari (1316) and Carta de Lugo (1395). But jurisdiction in these 
cases was exercised through hierarchies of courts, with a collection of villages 
at the lowest level, in the hand of a ruling class of mighty landlords. It was 
in no sense popular and integral to society in the manner of the Tswana. 
Tswana jurisprudence, on the other hand, was based upon the highly inclusive 
and popular code of mekgwa le melao (‘custom and law’), which facilitated 
a tacit and pervasive capture of the population into the structures of the 
state; whereas Sardinian law codes were both largely framed in the interest 
of the ruling class and, explains Berger (1986:130), ‘primarily concerned with 
protecting and stimulating grain production’. This means that, during the 
time of the giudicati, there was only limited penetration of the legislation 
and administration of justice into areas that were predominantly occupied 
by pastoralists. The giudicati did not, therefore, seem to embody such 
apparatuses of capture as the Tswana kingdoms.
The expansion of the modern state and issues of legitimacy 
Banditry in Sardinia, as I have explained, never had the conditions for the 
development of a mafia like that of Sicily. Neither has banditry given raise 
to violent political movements against the state, as found in other European 
‘peripheries’, such as the Basque Country and Corsica. In discussing why 
this has not happened, let me take my point of departure in the encounters 
I have had with people around the island. In these I have often sensed a 
highly ambiguous – if not antagonistic – attitude to the Italian nation-
state, particularly in comparison with my experience of how readily most 
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people of Botswana have accepted – even strongly appreciated – the post-
colonial state (albeit not always its political leaders). I have frequently found 
myself participating in conversations, in many different quarters, where 
strong opinions have been expressed about being exploited by an alien and 
external power – in some people’s view, even to the extent of considering 
Sardinia as still being colonized. References are typically made to Italian 
state appropriation of vast areas for military purposes, including the use of 
Sardinia as a testing ground for Italy’s NATO allies and the establishment of 
the largest NATO airport in the Mediterranean. For many years, American 
nuclear-submarine bases featured as an epitome of external encroachment 
and domination. The perceived abuse of the island as a dumping ground for 
dangerous waste, including nuclear waste, symbolizes to virtually everybody 
with whom I have discussed this matter in Sardinia, the exploitative character 
of the Italian state (see, for example, Codonesu 2013).
The idea of the Italian state as a dominant and destructive force is 
sometimes epitomized by Sardinians imagining the Sicilian mafia operating 
in the disguise of state officials. For example, as one of my acquaintances 
complained, ‘virtually all the prefects sent from Rome to our island are actually 
Sicilians…’ Such conspiracies have many expressions, a more recent one 
referring to the Chinese’s ostensible destructive penetration into the Sardinian 
economy, which, in popular discourse, involves a plot in which the Italian 
mafia joins forces with the Chinese mafia. As for the state’s justice, this is not 
only challenged by highland Sardinians’ rejection of the state monopolization 
of violence in some contexts. As elsewhere in Italy, the judicial system is 
perceived to be as infiltrated by personal relations and private interests 
as political life is in general. Recently, a major conflict built up in Sardinia 
regarding the installation of windmills for the generation of electric power 
in areas where they clash seriously with environmental interests. Popular 
protests levelled against the state were strongly nourished by the fact that the 
state supported off-island companies that wanted to exploit the island without 
generating any local benefits; it was also protested that the state had allowed 
strong mafia interests – allegedly Cosa Nostra – to infiltrate political bodies 
in the pursuit of reaping grand profits.11
Despite the popular critical views on the Italian state, Sardinia has not, I 
reiterate, developed the kind of permanent violent political movements that 
have become prevalent in other European peripheries. There have, however, 
11 For example, L’Espresso, one of Italy’s two major weekly magazines on political and 
societal issues, published, as the lead article (6 May 2010), a story about the way 
the Cosa Nostra is linking up with the state and regional leadership in an attempt 
to penetrate the emerging sector of green energy. 
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been a few – unsuccessful – attempts along such lines that illuminate the 
constraints involved. In the late 1960s, ‘radical Sardinians believed in a 
guerrilla struggle to earn independence for the island, [coining] the slogan 
“oggi banditti domani partisan” (“today bandits tomorrow resistance fighters”)’ 
(Schweizer 1988:223). However, this never eventuated. Between 1978 and 1982 
Barbagia Rossa operated as a militant popular organization with a strong 
communist orientation, hostile to the substantial increase in the number 
of military bases on the island. Many violent attacks were mounted against 
the military installations, but the organization remained without significant 
appeal to Sardinians at large. To a considerable extent the members of the 
Barbagia Rossa, which was linked with the Brigate Rosse on the mainland, 
were viewed by many people as criminals, because of their violent approach, 
rather than freedom fighters. After four years, the group was dismantled and 
its members jailed. 
Despite the negative attitudes prevailing in the population towards the 
Italian state, the large majority of the people have been captured into its 
order. This means that mobilizations against the Italian state rarely exceed 
the limits set by state law. Heatherington’s (2010:184ff.) accounts from the 
typical village of Barbagia banditismo – Orgosolo – illuminates how outlaw 
resistance to the state is currently perceived by quite a number of people 
as operating detrimentally to their interests. In discussing this community’s 
attempt to challenge a major state encroachment – the establishment of a 
National Park on their pastoral commons – this author explains how popular 
protest involved constructing a ‘moral discourse of embodied connections 
to land and landscape not only as actual herders but through broadly shared 
ties of work, food, and history linked to the Commons’ (ibid.:186–7). As 
part of their attempts to establish authority as the authentic custodians of 
the commons, the organizers invited many people from different parts of 
the island to a festival in the honour of a local female icon, signifying their 
genuine connection to the landscape that was about to be appropriated into 
the domain of the state. This effort involved the demonstration of virtues that 
had resonance far beyond the Barbagia, above all that of hospitality.
The endeavour was, however, totally undermined by an ostensibly 
shocking action exercised by some elements within the community. A wild 
sheep – the ‘poster-animal’ for the pro-park movements in Sardinia, including 
the World Wide Fund for Nature – was found slaughtered and hanging at 
the crossroad leading to the festival, along with red spray-painted threats to 
politicians of all levels. The action, condemned by many as a disgrace, was 
attributed to a group naming itself ‘Armed Anti-Park Front’ that had already 
acknowledged vandalism and threats. It is precisely the tacitly accepted and 
capricious character of such violence that underscores its rhizomic character. 
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It is contradicting and undermining of local popular efforts to gain broader 
support for a challenge to the state in the wider Sardinian context by appealing 
to virtues that are also held by people beyond the limits of the highlands of 
Barbagia.
There is a heightened fear amongst villagers in the highlands of perceived 
malicious and violent practices, including faida, that have, as I have explained, 
ideally been conducted according to the above mentioned ‘Il Codice della 
Vendetta Barbaricina’ in the pursuit of onore. The societal transformations 
over the last few decades have set in motion trends deteriorating the ideals 
of this codice. While faida used to be clearly restricted to two distinctive 
factions within a village, such factions have increasingly become linked to 
external networks through which foreign killers are recruited. They now 
operate in non-localized gangs, allegedly sometimes with mafiosi connections. 
These networks, which might include members of feuding families who have 
migrated out of the village (see Cossu 2007:174), are working in much harsher 
and more unpredictable ways than before. It is hence not unusual to hear 
complaints from villagers who say that they feel trapped in dangerous games 
of organized criminality, characterized by the highly unpredictable exercise 
of violence. In the view of my interlocutors, this conduct of faida conflicts 
seriously with virtues of onore and balentia – and hence is sometimes spoken 
of as balentia negativa.
The exercise of the kind of violence with which I have been concerned 
here has hence become much more unpredictable than before, readily leaving 
not only the feuding factions but the whole community in anxiety and fear. 
Many people I have met see this as a corruption of the principles and virtues 
of faida that makes these communities increasingly receptive to the state 
hegemonic discourse on justice, order and the criminalization of ancient 
practices of violence that have considerable symbolic value. Popular concern 
in these communities about this trend finds its expressions in calls to be, as 
in one community widely reputed for highly violent faida (Orune) put it, ‘piu 
umana e piu civile’ (‘more human and more civilized’) (Contesta 1996:131).
The increasing ambiguity of banditismo is manifested, above all, in the 
linking of persons associated with pastoral communities with networks of 
trafficking – drugs, prostitutes and weapon – spanning Sardinia and beyond. 
This development raises great anxiety and fear everywhere, including in 
Barbagia communities, about the serious directions now taken by violent 
practices on the island. From the point of view of Sardinian highland villagers, 
the symbolic wealth vested in Il Codice della Vendetta Barbaricina and the 
esteemed virtues of banditismo are hence vulnerable to desecration. Moreover, 
the distinctiveness of Barbagia banditismo, as consisting of locally esteemed 
practices challenging social order and state jurisdiction, has been more 
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and more distorted by manifesting – in most people’s view – mainstream 
organized criminality.
The expansion of the modern state as super-structural: ‘positive’ 
interventions of the state apparatus of capture
At the same time as people in the highlands have developed an increasingly 
critical attitude towards violent practices, and a more accepting orientation 
towards the state exercise of jurisdiction, they have also been captured into 
the interior of the state by its extensive exercise of positive power, in the 
Foucauldian sense (1980:121f.). When the Italian state started to penetrate 
Sardinia in the 1870s, the island was characterized by poor communication 
that made many communities isolated and the Sardinians divided. The 
communities themselves were organizationally focused as famiglia,12 a social 
form founded on the principles, internally, of solidarity and mutual support. 
Externally, the famiglia was linked to individuated networks of friendship 
(amicizia), mediators (mediatore) and patron-client relationships. The local 
communities have, as explained above, generally been described as tense 
and competitive, and are characterized by families’ and individuals’ defence 
of livestock, land and honour (onore). Under these circumstances – and in 
a context of inequality of wealth and thus power – people have sought the 
protection of patronage. At the arrival of the agents of the state, existing and 
new networks of patron-client relations have developed and progressively 
captured people – directly and indirectly – into dependency on the state, 
which accelerated as the welfare state developed after the Second World War.
From an early stage in the development of the modern state in Italy, 
explains Pareto (1950), patronage became pervasive in political life. With 
such a conjuncture of internal and external premises for organizing relations 
of power on Sardinia, it is no surprise that patron-client ties emerged as the 
dominant mode of local political organization. Gaps in the system – between 
village and town, and between villagers and the governing elite – opened up for 
mediators and patronage (Weingrod 1968:391). The generation of clientelistic 
networks by state agents was tremendously amplified after the Second World 
War, when the Democrazia Cristiana (DC – the Christian Democratic Party) 
was in power for almost 40 years, and in control of the vast resources of an 
ever expanding welfare state. The intertwining of party and state gave rise to 
what was known as a partitocrazia, by means of which the DC penetrated 
the state, taking control of a large number of public institutions. Patron-client 
relations became pervasive at all governmental levels, not only in Sardinia, 
12 That ‘family’ encompassed, at the most, parents and their unmarried children and 
married sons with their offspring.
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but also throughout Italy (Newell 2000:48). Of course, the Catholic Church 
represented a major and tacit force underpinning this development (see 
Pollard 2008:157ff.).
While the militant political movement Barbagia Rossa has remained with 
virtually no popular support, Sardinian political parties that have worked 
peacefully, on constitutional premises, in the pursuit of greater – even, by 
some, full – independence for the island, have also not been very appealing to 
the electorate. This reflects the fact that the Sardinian branches of the Italian 
national parties have been well resourced to expand clientelistic networks that 
have captured the Sardinians into a perceived dependency on the state. The 
national political parties have successfully created an image of themselves as 
indispensable in advocating Sardinian interests in Rome.
The extensive clientelistic networks that have captured much of the 
population into the structures of the state are, of course, neither formal nor 
official parts of governmental institutions. They are, in a profound socio-
cultural sense, formations vested in the population that both pre-date and 
go beyond the modern Italian state government, and, crucially, infiltrate this 
government in ever new ways. I shall return to their consequent ambiguous 
relationship to the state. In the present context, I want to emphasize that 
they illuminate the way the state prevails, as already suggested, by virtue of 
being ‘superstructural in relation to a whole series of existing power networks’ 
(Foucault 1980:122). This is, as suggested above, in important respects the 
way in which the colonial state brought itself into control of the peoples of 
Bechuanaland – by capturing into its interior the structures of a number 
of Tswana merafe. Elsewhere I explain extensively how these ‘patrimonial’ 
assemblages of power were, by de-colonization, quite smoothly incorporated 
into Botswana’s modern state formation (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 3–7). 
Even more importantly, indigenous relations and institutions in Botswana, 
as well as clientelistic formations in Italy, have, paradoxically, facilitated 
another important aspect of modern state formation: the governmentalization 
of the state in Foucault’s (1978) sense. Governmentalization captures the 
population into the structures of state domination through subtle and tacit 
practices, in which the state works on people’s subjectivities in an effort to 
feature as a positive force in popular imagination, especially through the 
implementation of welfare programmes. This concept helps us to identify and 
comprehend processes by which the state expands by intervening as a highly 
constructive force, with schools, health services, roads and other welfare 
facilities. Elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 7), I have explained – in the case 
of Botswana – how such interventions generate a register of new desires 
and dispositions that bring the population into dependency on the modern 
state, with all its welfare practices and provisions. A similar notion of state 
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‘positive’ power obviously pertains to the Italian state’s post-Second World 
War interventions on Sardinia. In combination with the rise of capitalism and 
the market economy, the governmentalization of the state has in both cases 
contributed to a tremendous expansion of the interiority of the state. 
Development of new spaces for the generation of rhizomic forces
It is an irony that with an expanding interiority of the state, new exteriorities 
– actual or potential – are developing, as reflected in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
notion of their mutually conditioning existence (see introduction section 
above). It is true that clientelistic networks have contributed immensely 
in capturing the population into a kind of dependency on the state that 
significantly reduces the potential for them to become a challenging force. 
Nonetheless, the political practices of particularism, the private character of 
political relations and the harsh and secretive exercise of power in clientelism 
represent major challenges to the ideals of the modern democratic state – 
they all contradict virtues of universalism and transparency. These are some 
of the grey areas in which rhizomic forces thrive, even at the heart of the 
state. Examples may be found in the representations of Berlusconi’s corrupt 
practices and his connections with mafia forces.
These grey areas are evident at all levels of the Italian government, and so 
are popular images of rhizomic forces and abuses of power that challenge the 
ideals of a state that provides welfare and justice for all citizens. In Sardinia, 
such imaginaries – fictional or real – of abuse of power amongst people in 
official positions, might well provoke popular reactions in the form of violent 
attacks on such people by, for example, setting fire to their cars or placing a 
bomb on the doorsteps of their houses. Because of the clientelistic and hence 
privatized character of the political field, popular activism in public space is 
restrained, often compelling people to express their challenges to the state and 
its agencies in a violent language. In other words, rank and file sections of the 
population – the vast majority – are readily generating an(other) exteriority to 
the state, where rhizomic forces thrive. What is more, the secretive character 
of violent practices is equally pertinent within the political field, and are a 
major premise for many people’s avoidance and even fear of engaging in 
politics. It seems evident that the perpetuation of violent practices reflects 
their longstanding genealogies on the island, and the reproduction of the 
virtues of revenge in many fields of the contemporary society.
The development of exteriorities to the modern state in Botswana, 
as well as the imaginaries of rhizomic forces there, are very different. 
Rather than privatized clientelistic networks, indigenous polities in Botswana 
contain institutionalized hierarchies of authority that have proved to be very 
instrumental in capturing the population into the predominantly public, 
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state-centred networks of power (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 4–7). There, modern 
political practices and governmental institutions ensure the distribution of 
public resources according to universal principles to a much greater extent 
than in Italy. Politicians have come to power, particularly during the first 
independence decades, without extensive corruption, mainly because they 
were in a position to tap the state treasury through parliamentary-sanctioned 
programmes, projects and policies of ‘development’ (Gulbrandsen 2014:ch. 
3). This represented a major condition, during the formative decades of the 
post-colonial state in Botswana, for the capture of all the significant elites 
of the country into the process of state-formation, ensuring the strength of 
the state and a high degree of stability in the political leadership. There was, 
however, a turning point in the late 1980s, when a tremendous expansion of 
urban centres and the non-farming sectors of the economy was in progress. 
With the resources of the state treasury deriving from diamond mining, ever 
stronger private interests penetrated the organs of the state, as reflected in an 
increasing number of corruption scandals (Good 2008).
These developments – the ‘legal’ tapping of generous ‘development’ 
programmes as well as mounting corrupt practices – brought a number of 
people rapidly to power and wealth, while the vast majority remained in 
poverty. As I have explained elsewhere (Gulbrandsen 2003, 2014:ch. 8), this 
development gave rise to a popular discourse of ‘ritual murder’, in which 
people of power and wealth – chiefly elite politicians – might be suspected of 
using the occult in abuses of power. That is, in the popular imaginary, there 
evolved a space at the heart of the state where people empowered themselves 
by means of such highly unconstitutional methods as killing a girl to obtain 
perceived highly potent ‘medicine’. In this imaginary, such people are secretly 
engaging in violent battles for power and wealth, generating disastrous 
‘heat’ that is perceived as destructive to kagiso at the state centre, and which 
is therefore damaging to the entire nation. This case illuminates how the 
conception of rhizomic forces at the political centre – anchored in indigenous 
cosmology – has given rise to a subaltern popular discourse that attacks the 
perceived dangerous and destructive exercise of power amongst people in 
control of the state.
Conclusion
In this chapter I have been centrally concerned with transmutations of power 
relations in a long-term perspective. Inspired by Clastres, and by Deleuze and 
Guattari’s conception of forces working inside and outside the state, I have 
attempted to demonstrate how differently state forces penetrate populations 
in contrasting colonial situations and historical contexts. On the one hand, the 
British colonizers readily captured the Tswana kingdoms into their structures 
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and made the local institutions instrumental in bringing the population 
under firm control with a minimal exercise of violence. As these kingdoms 
themselves embodied state apparatuses of capture, they proved highly useful 
for implementing principles of indirect rule. This meant that practically all 
the peoples of the Bechuanaland Protectorate were quite peacefully brought 
under the control of the colonial state, and remained so for about eighty years.
On the other hand, while the successive colonial states in Sardinia have 
had few problems in bringing the lowland populations under their control, 
colonization of the highlands has been met with severe resistance ever since 
the Phoenicians expanded into the island some 2,600 years ago. This resistance 
has, to a great extent, been a matter of escaping state control by creating 
spaces outside the state with considerable potential for generating rhizomic 
forces that recurrently challenge civil security and state order. These forces 
reflect a rejection of state’s insistence on the monopoly of physical violence. 
The confrontational relationship between the successive colonizing states and 
the highlanders finds, as I have discussed, its most vigorous expression in the 
practices of banditismo, which are greatly determined by highlanders’ cultural 
valorization of a distinctive form of honour that finds its most prominent 
expression in virtues of masculinity and virility (balentia). 
The Tswana – and peoples they have captured into their socio-political 
structures – quite readily identified with, and submitted to, the hierarchical 
and institutionalized order of their kingdoms. Moreover, as I have explained, 
the Tswana strongly valued non-violent practices of conflict resolution in the 
pursuit of the highly esteemed value of reconciliation and hence kagiso. This 
involves practices and institutions of jurisprudence that became integral to the 
colonial state, and then the modern state of Botswana.
Unlike the Tswana, the Sardinian highlanders have no indigenous 
institutionalized structure beyond the level of la famiglia for conflict 
resolution. This, in combination with a strong orientation towards competitive 
egalitarianism centred on virtues of balentia, readily led to never-ending 
vendettas – highly esteemed practices of violence that highlanders have 
fiercely protected against police interference. The state insistence on the 
monopoly of physical violence has been strongly resisted.
The colonization of the peoples of the Bechuanaland Protectorate resulted 
in a transmutation of power, in the sense of expanding and strengthening 
domination of the Tswana kingdoms, in addition to propelling their integration 
into the interior of the colonial state. By contrast, the transmutations of power 
caused by the colonizers’ intrusions on Sardinia have entailed progressively 
increasing polarization between state forces and the highland population, and 
recurrent challenges from the exterior of the state. Only recently has a very 
different mode of power transmutation been initiated, with the establishment 
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of the modern welfare state after the Second World War. This was, I have 
explained, a matter of a governmentalization of the state that in Italy – as well 
as in Botswana – immensely reinforced the state apparatus of capture.
In Botswana, the institutions of the Tswana kingdoms proved highly 
conducive to a major transformation in the exercise of power, embedding 
most of the population in the development of the post-colonial state. In the 
Italian context, this reinforcement was facilitated by pervasive structures of 
patronage that proved very instrumental in the state government’s penetration 
of Italian society, including the interior of Sardinia. Nevertheless, in both 
cases we have also seen how these recent transformations of power relations 
have given rise to new exteriorities of the state, with rhizome-generating 
potentialities that encourage people to call for civic order and a state that 
supports the common good.
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